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Abstract
Equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) implies the marginal cost of funds
to the borrower is infinite. So borrowers have an overwhelming incentive to cut their loan by a dollar and
thereby avoiding being rationed. Ways of doing this include scaling down the project, cutting consumption
or infinitesimally delaying the project to accumulate more saving. All of these routes are normally feasible in
which case credit rationing is impossible.
∗CMPO, University of Bristol
†London School of Economics
1
1 Introduction
In their justly celebrated paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (SW) (1981) demonstrate that, in the presence of asymmetric
information, interest rates cannot be counted on to clear credit markets. The claim is not that rationing always
emerges, but that the conditions can plausibly be satisfied. There has naturally been discussion of just how
restrictive are the requirements. This paper argues that if entrepreneurs can save or adjust the start date of their
project it is almost impossible to generate credit rationing.
Bester (1986) was the first to question whether credit rationing is at all general. He shows that if borrowers
can post collateral, a separating equilibrium emerges and credit rationing disappears. SW (1986) respond by
showing that when collateral is limited there may be equilibria in which some or all borrowers post all of their
assets as collateral (or provide maximum self finance) yet do not have enough assets to achieve separation. With
no further scope for lowering fail-state income, the only way to combat moral hazard or influence the composition
of borrowers is by adjusting the repayment in the event of solvency (the interest rate). The way is now open for
credit rationing in the sense of banks randomly choosing which borrowers receive credit.1 Or is it? At a credit
rationing equilibrium, the marginal value of an additional dollar of internal funds is eﬀectively infinite. Unless the
cost of cutting consumption or the currrent dividend is also infinite, entrepreneurs will find some money. However,
if this is not possible, the start date of the project can be delayed. Adopting this option allows entrepreneurs
to earn interest on their assets and the extra self finance or collateral made possible alleviates moral hazard
or allows extra signalling opportunities. To rule this out it must be assumed that postponement, rather than
allowing for more eﬀective planning, causes major deterioration in project prospects. Even this is not enough for
credit rationing. Scaling down the project reduces borrowing requirements and so avoids the infinite marginal
cost of funds in a rationing equilibrium. Whatever the asset endowment of the entrepreneurs there is almost no
scope for random credit rationing.
To examine this conclusion more explicitly, note that SW proposed two routes by which higher interest rates
may cause bank profit to deteriorate. The adverse selection eﬀect works through changes in the composition
1Even if collateral is limited, credit rationing cannot arise if borrowers diﬀer in ability rather than intrinsic risk (de Meza and
Webb (1987)). There has been little formal testing of the existence of credit rationing. An exception is Berger and Udell (1992)
which does not find evidence in favour.
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of borrowers. When interest rates are high, entrepreneurs with relatively safe projects almost always default
whereas those with equal expected returns but a riskier distribution sometimes perform suﬃciently well to net
the entrepreneur a jackpot. As rates rise, the safe types are the first to drop out. From the banks’ perspective,
there is therefore a disadvantageous change in the quality of the loan pool.
Incentive eﬀects arise when entrepreneurs’ project choice is not verifiable. For the reasons already established,
an interest rate rise implies that debt financed entrepreneurs obtain a private benefit from switching to riskier
strategies, causing the bank to lose out. A high interest rate, by diminishing the payoﬀ to success, has the further
moral-hazard eﬀect of discouraging eﬀort. This, too, implies that the bank’s return function with respect to its
loan rate may reach a turning point.
The final step in establishing credit rationing involves the assumption of an upward sloping supply curve of
deposits. Suppose that at the loan rate that maximises the banks’ gross return, the highest interest rate banks
can oﬀer depositors and still break even, does not attract enough funds for all loan applicants to proceed. Credit
rationing then emerges.
This paper scrutinises these argument more closely. What we show is that if a bank is at the turning point
of its return function, as is required for credit rationing, the borrower’s marginal cost of funds is infinite. It is
therefore worth the borrower incurring any finite cost to reduce the required loan size. There are a variety of
ways to do this. The entrepreneur can increase self finance by reducing current consumption. Since in reality
saving is almost always a feasible option, equilibrium credit-rationing in the sense of SW does not seem likely to
be of practical relevance. That is, there is almost always some small personal expenditure an entrepreneur could
eliminate without disastrous eﬀect. Another possibility is delaying the start of the project, even infinitesimally.
This allows interest on the borrower’s savings to accumulate, thereby reducing the loan needed when the project
eventually commences. Other escape routes from credit rationing with analytically similar properties include the
entrepreneur scaling down the project, choosing less capital-intensive production techniques, and working harder
to accumulate more wealth prior to starting the project. If any of these actions are possible, even minimally,
credit rationing cannot occur.
Three papers have examined the interaction of saving opportunities, capital market imperfections and the
timing of investment. Parker (2000) utilizes a continuous time model to examine the impact of exogenous
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borrowing constraints on the decision of whether and when to become an entrepreneur. Inability to borrow more
than a pre-specified amount may lead to the postponement of a business start up rather than its abandonment.
The origin of the borrowing constraint and whether a credit-rationing equilibrium is consistent with endogenous
timing is not considered. Lensink and Sterken (2001,2002) analyze a model in which entrepreneurs are endowed
with projects that have returns that diﬀer by mean-preserving spreads. A project’s risk characteristic is the
private information of the entrepreneur. The novel ingredient is that by deferring the start date by a period, the
entrepreneur finds out whether the project will succeed or fail. Thus projects which wait never default, whilst
those that start immediately do. To determine whether credit rationing is possible LS examine what happens
to overall default rates if all banks raise their current and future interest rates. They argue that if the riskier
projects are the first to be delayed as the interest rate rises, the impact eﬀect of rises in interest rates is to drive
bad firms out of the loan market and not good firms as in the SW model. This reduces the empirical relevance
of credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss. In the current paper, with much weaker and more general
assumptions, in models with both moral hazard and hidden type we show the generic implausibility of equilibrium
credit rationing .
Our model is more conventional in assuming that the mere passage of time is not informative. Entrepreneurs
only find out the properties of the project (or their own abilities, or the state of the world) by the experience of
running the project. Delay does though allow financial assets to accumulate and so reduce the size of the required
loan. Banks do condition the interest rate on this information which allows full separation to emerge and hence
credit rationing is precluded.
The remainder of this paper makes explicit the incompatibility of saving and credit rationing. In the next
section we examine the case of moral hazard. After setting up a benchmark static model we consider the
impact of saving rates,varying the project scale and endogenising the project start date. In Section 3 we look at
hidden types. When the nature of heterogeneity is that entrepreneurs’ returns diﬀer by mean preserving shifts, a
separating equilibrium emerges, in which safe entrepreneurs delay their projects but there is no random rationing.
When entrepreneurs’ return distributions can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance, there is a pooling
equilibrium with no delay. Once again, random rationing does not feature; in fact too many projects are funded.
In the interest of transparency the assumptions are not as general as they might be and, as with much of the
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literature, we do not embed the analysis in a full general equilibrium model.
2 A Basic Static Moral-Hazard Model
To set the scene we examine the possibility of credit rationing in the standard model. Some fraction of a risk-
neutral population are endowed with a project with fixed capital requirement K, which when activated, with
probability p(E) instantaneously yields S, or else gross revenue is zero, where E is the eﬀort of the entrepreneur.
We assume that p0 > 0 and p00 < 0.2 Although entrepreneurs have some initial financial resources of their
own, these are insuﬃcient to self-finance the project. Debt finance is available from competitive banks. The
most straightforward justification for debt as the equilibrium financial contract is that it is costly to verify project
revenue but cheap to verify whether a contracted payment is made. Incentive compatibility is achieved by allowing
the bank to seize project revenue if the payment is missed.3
The entrepreneur has initial wealth W =WL +WI , where WL denotes the liquid wealth endowment and WI
denotes the value to the entrepreneur of their illiquid wealth endowment. Illiquid wealth can only be transformed
into investment capital at a cost.4 Since wealth may involve costly liquidation, in a competitive financial market
it is never worse for the entrepreneur to pledge wealth as collateral that is returned in the event of success, rather
than invest directly in the project. This follows because in the latter case liquidation costs are only incurred in
the event of failure. Granted that debt is risky, project failure loses the entrepreneur W = WL +WI , where
the value of each asset posted as collateral is WL ≤ WL and WI ≤ WI . The entrepreneur’s expected utility is
therefore
V = p (E) [S −D] + p (E)W −E + (1− p (E)) (W −W ) (1)
2These assumptions on the shape of the p(E) function are equivalent to assuming a cost of eﬀort function E(p) that is convex
with E0 > 0 and E00 > 0.
3We assume that borrowers cannot very eﬀectively expropiate returns prior to seizure.
4Proportional liquidation costs raise the possibility of corner solutions where entrepreneurs commit only liquid wealth to their
project deciding not to incur any (expected) costs of liquidation. Fixed costs have a similar threshold eﬀect but have no eﬀfect beyond
the threshold at which they are incurred
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where D is the contracted repayment on debt. The FOC with respect to eﬀort is
p0[(S −D) +W ]− 1 = 0 (2)
Project lending is risky, so competitive banks must charge a premium to cover the chance of default. The safe
rate of interest is denoted by r but for simplicity we keep this equal to zero .5 The debt contract returns D to
the bank in the event of success and the pledged collateral is recovered by the bank in the event of default. The
equilibrium repayment satisfies the break even condition
pD + (1− p)W = K (3)
From (2),
p00[(S −D) +W ]dE − p0dD = 0 (4)
and from (3) µ
p+ p0
dE
dD
(D −W )
¶
dD = −(1− p)dW (5)
Then (4) and (5) imply
dD
dW
=
−(1− p)
p+ p0 dEdD (D −W )
=
−(1− p)
p+ (D−W )p
02
p00(S−D+W )
(6)
From (1), using (2)
dV
dW
= (1− dD
dW
)p− 1 + [p0((S −D) +W )− 1] dE
dW
(7)
= (1− dD
dW
)p− 1
Consider the possibility of a credit rationing equilibrium.The bank’s expected gross return is R = pD +
(1− p)W so
dR
dD
= p+ p0
dE
dD
(D −W ) = p+ (D −W )p
02
p00(S −D +W ) (8)
5A full general equilibrium analysis would endogenise r, the safe rate of interest. This though would be a distraction in the present
context since our demonstration that borrowers reject all loans oﬀered at the rationing interest rate is independent of the level of r.
Note though that in a closed economy, at any moment the aggregate supply of lending is totally inelastic, so were it not for the point
made in this paper, credit rationing would be a possibility.
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From (7), when the bank is close to the turning point of its returns function ( so dRdD is close to zero and
dD
dW
tends to minus infinity) dVdW is certainly positive and tends to plus infinity. Hence, the only possible rationing
equilibrium is in the corner with W =W and dVdW > 0, with entrepreneur totally destitute in the event of failure.
Were entrepreneurs risk averse (as analysed in the Appendix) finding a credit rationing equilibrium is even
more problematic. Now entrepreneurs limit their commitment of collateral to the project, thereby trading-oﬀ
risk-bearing against the reduction of moral hazard. Corner solutions must satisfy more restrictive conditions
and are impossible if the Inada condition holds. The proof that an interior solution is inconsistent with credit
rationing stands though. In such an equilibrium posting an extra dollar of collateral has a finite expected utility
cost, even when the extra risk is accounted for but at the bank’s turning point the marginal saving in interest
payments is infinite. So, by making it less likely that entrepreneurs would willingly pledge all their assets as
collateral, risk aversion further limits the possibility of rationing.
2.1 The Static Model with Divisible Projects
Changing project scale is an alternative to self finance or pledging collateral. Consider a static model that allows
for the possibility that the firm has a divisible technology that must be implemented immediately. In particular let
gross success revenue be S(K) with S0 > 0 and S00 < 0. With maximum self-finance the entrepreneur’s expected
utility is
V = p (E) [S(K)−D]−E (9)
The FOC with respect to eﬀort is
p0 [S −D]− 1 = 0 (10)
The equilibrium repayment must satisfy the bank’s break even condition
pD = K −W (11)
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From (11)
pdD + p0dE = dK (12)
and from (10),
p00 (S −D) dE + p0[dS − dD] = 0 (13)
so from (12) and (13)
dD
dK
=
Dp0
2
S0
p00(S−D) + 1
p+ Dp
02
p00(S−D)
(14)
Making use of (14) and (12), from (9), at an interior optimum,
dV
dK
= p(S0 − dD
dK
) + [p0(S −D)− 1] dE
dK
= (15)
p[S0 −
Dp0
2
S0
p00(S−D) + 1
p+ Dp
02
p00(S−D)
] = 0
From the bank’s return function
dR
dD
= p+ p0
dE
dD
D = p+
p02D
p00(S −D) (16)
dR
dDapproaches zero in a credit-rationing equilibrium, but if S
0 is finite, as must surely be true at any positive
project scale, from (15) this is inconsistent with dVdK = 0. The firm will cut back the scale of investment rather
that face the prospect of being rationed.
3 Intertemporal Models
Though the prospects of equilibrium rationing emerging seem bleak, further considerations appear to restore the
possibility. First, liquidating some assets may involve a fixed cost. The absolute saving in interest payments
from lowering borrowing may not be enough to cover this cost, so there could be rationing even if not all assets
are surrendered in the event of default. Second, for good or ill the government typically exempts some assets
from seizure. If this threshold is suﬃciently high (and in some US states even the family home is immune) credit
rationing may result. The next section shows that when intertemporal considerations are introduced even these
cases of rationing are eliminated endogenise savings we consider two simple extensions of our model.
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3.1 Model 1
Assume that there are two periods. Current assets are W0 of which C0 is consumed. Next period a project
costing K is to be run. Some of the entrepreneur’s savings are put towards project finance and the rest, C1, is
consumed in the second period (the risk free rate of interest is zero). Banks provide the remainder of the finance,
K −W + C0 + C1. The entrepreneurs expected utility is
V = U(C0) + p(E)U (C1 + S −D) + (1− p(E))U (C1)−E (17)
The second period choice of E satisfies
p0(E)[U (C1 + S −D)− U (C1)] = 1 (18)
so
dE
dD
= −U
0 (C1 + S −D)
p00
< 0 (19)
Then,
dV
dC0
= U 0 (C0)− PU 0 (C1 + S −D)
dD
dC0
(20)
The competitive banks break even so
pD = K −W + C0 + C1 (21)
from which, using (19), we have
dD
dC0
=
1
p− Dp0U 0(C1+S−D)p00
(22)
and substituting into (20) yields
dV
dC0
= U 0 (C0)−
pU 0 (C1 + S −D)
p− Dp0U 0(C1+S−D)p00
(23)
However, from (21), using (19), we have
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dR
dD
= p− Dp
0U 0 (C1 + S −D)
p00
(24)
Approaching the turning point of the revenue function dVdC0 tends to minus infinity, at least if U
0 (C0) is finite, as
is surely true in any practical case, since entrepreneurs can always find an extra dollar from current consumption
without too much strain. If credit rationing prevails, the cost of the last unit of consumption is infinite.
3.2 Model 2
Even if entrepreneurs have exhausted the possibilities for curtailing current consumption there are still escape
routes from credit rationing. Lets assume risk neutrality, so there is no loss to the entrepreneur in concentrating
consumption at a single instant. Now there is still the escape route from rationing of postponing the project’s
start date. For simplicity, assume that all wealth is liquid and is invested directly in the project. 6 Project
returns are delivered instantaneously. The discount rate is constant and positive.7 The project can be activated
just once, but this can be at any time in the entrepreneur’s long life.8 With maximum self-finance, if the project
is operated at time τ , the entrepreneur’s expected utility is
V = e−rτ {p (E) [S(τ)−D]−E} (25)
where the dependency of S on τ reflects the possibility that the project deteriorates if postponed, S0(τ) < 0. The
FOC with respect to eﬀort is
p0 [S −D]− 1 = 0 (26)
The entrepreneur has initial wealth W0, so by time τ this has grown to W0erτ , all of which is invested in the
project. Project lending is risky, so competitive banks must charge a premium to cover the chance of default.
The equilibrium repayment must satisfy the break even condition
6The alternative of pledging this wealth as collateral makes no diﬀerence in this case and this formulation leads to slightly simpler
algebra.
7As we show that for credit rationing projects must be activated instantaneously or not at all, this assumption is consistent with
the flow of fundable projects being constant.
8Though S or p may decline with τ , as later noted, this does not aﬀect the results.
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pD = K −Woerτ (27)
Substituting (27) into (25)
V = e−rτ
½·
S − K −W0e
rτ
p
¸
p(E)−E
¾
(28)
From (27)
pdD + p0dE = −rW0erτdτ (29)
and from (26),
p00 (S −D) dE + p0[dS − dD] = 0 (30)
so
dD
dτ =
Dp0
2 dS
dτ
p00(S−D) − rW0e
rτ
p+ Dp
02
p00(S−D)
(31)
which for an interior optimum starting time must be negative. Making use of (31) and (26), form (25)
dV
dτ = e
−rτ{p (E) dS
dτ − r [p(E)(S −D)−E)]− p(E)[
Dp0
2 dS
dτ
p00(S−D) − rW0e
rτ
p+ Dp
02
p00(S−D)
]}
Moreover from the bank’s return function
dR
dD
= p+ p0
dE
dD
D = p+
p02D
p00(S −D) (33)
The first thing to note is that credit rationing is inconsistent with an an interior solution. From (33), if dSdτ ≤ 0,
then dVdτ = 0 requires that the final square bracket must be negative and finite but under credit rationing¡
dR
dD = 0
¢
this term is plus or minus infinity. If dSdτ ≥ 0 the final square bracketed term is negative so under credit
rationing must be minus infinity. The only possibility for credit rationing is thus the corner solution τ = 0.This
is not easily achieved though. Suppose dS(0)dτ ≥ 0 which is to say that some level of planning is valuable, then
from (33) credit rationing at τ = 0. That is, even if the entrepreneur is oﬀered a loan at the credit-rationing
interest rate, it is optimal to reject it and postpone starting the project. Doing so allows extra wealth to be
accumulated, shrinking the required loan and, due to the moral hazard, more than proportionately lowering the
debt repayment. It follows that there cannot be a credit-rationing equilibrium.
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